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Manuel Franzmann  
From “Atheism” to “Religious Indifference”. Suggestions for Future 
Research on Secularization. 
Introduction 
More than fifteen years ago, Rodney Stark expressed his hope that after nearly three centuries 
of thought about there being a trend towards secularization, the social sciences could now 
leave the “secularization thesis” behind (Stark 1999). This hope has not been fulfilled. On the 
contrary, never before has there been so much controversy and research on the subject. After 
years of incantatory funeral eulogies for the thesis, a wave of new research has emerged on 
issues of "atheism", "unbelief", "non-religion", "secularity", "agnosticism", "religious 
indifference", and "secularization". The fundamental attacks against the thesis thus seem to 
have had a mobilizing effect. 
Two years before Stark published his "Secularization R.I.P." article, Peter L. Berger, the most 
prominent secularization theorist of the 1960s and 1970s, followed the growing criticism and 
abandoned the thesis (Berger 1997, see also Berger 1999). He confessed that for him "modem 
secularity is a much more puzzling phenomenon than all these religious explosions" (Berger 
1999: 12). With this statement, he wanted to confirm that religion is the rule and a secular 
life-conduct a rather strange exception. It is interesting to note, however, how he admitted that 
he never gained understanding of secular lives despite being engaged for decades as an expert 
in secularization theory. Many researchers today draw the conclusion that more research has 
to be done about these "puzzling" things. They are right in doing so, for without clarifying 
secularity, secularization theory remains unclear too. 
It is no coincidence that most of the controversies about the theory concern its validity with 
regard to the individual. Many scientists still agree that there is something called the 
secularization of the state or of societal institutions. However, they often disagree about a 
trend towards the secularization of people and their life concepts. Nonetheless, for a long time 
almost nobody followed Colin Campbell's call in 1971 for a "sociology of irreligion" 
(Campbell 1971). Although "secularization" was a controversially discussed subject in the 
sociology of religion for many decades, few researchers engaged in empirically reconstructing 
secularized modes of faith and life-conduct in a systematic way at the individual level. In fact, 
this research desideratum is actually much older than Campbell's call. Max Weber had already 
expressed the notion that the secular world views of his contemporaries (i.e. their secular 
continuation of protestant ethics) was a puzzle (to him) (Weber 2001: 32; Weber and Kalberg 
2001: 30). However, he never decided to analyze it systematically, and nor have most of his 
successors for a very long time. 
It is thus little wonder that many misconceptions about individual secularization were not 
subsequently overcome. To name four arbitrarily chosen examples: 1.) Rodney Stark still 
thinks that there is no substantial difference between paganism (with its magical worldview) 
and secularized ("disenchanted") models of life-conduct (see e.g. his argument against a 
"golden age of faith", Stark and Finke 2000: 63-72). 2.) Many scholars use "secularization" 
and "desacralization" synonymously, as if secular people had no values and nothing was 
sacred to them. However, it seems appropriate that Max Weber spoke only of 
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"disenchantment", "rationalization" and "intellectualization", but never of "desacralization". 
3.) To the secular life, Peter L. Berger (and others) generally ascribe "the shallowness of a 
culture that tries to get along without any transcendent points of reference" (Berger 1999: 13). 
This characterization would be true only if you restrict the notion of transcendence to 
religious forms right from the start. However, in this case the argument would be circular and 
pointless. In fact, there are secular modes of transcendence, which refer to a community, to 
humankind or to something like George Herbert Mead's "logical universe of discourse". 
These things still exist after the individual's death and can motivate personal devotion to 
others, to the common good, etc. 4.) Many scholars are used to speaking of secular "unbelief", 
"disbelief" or "non-belief" (among them atheistic as well as religious scholars). However, this 
is a misleading language for analytical purposes. In relation to a particular belief, e.g. a belief 
in god, it might be usable. As a general diction, it erroneously suggests that secular people do 
not believe in anything (this implies that this is either because they are completely depressed 
and hopeless human beings or, on the contrary, because they conduct their life only based on 
supreme scientific "knowledge"). In fact, each form of life-conduct rests on belief. 
Secularization does not resolve belief. It only transforms the contents of belief. That is why I 
proposed to use the notion of "secular or secularized belief" (or "faith") instead of "unbelief" 
(Franzmann 2014). 
Many misconceptions become obvious, if we engage systematically in empirically 
reconstructing the structure, logic, and the particular characteristics of secularized belief and 
life-conduct at the individual level in their diverse variants. I have done this for many years 
based on interviews and biographical material (Franzmann 2005; Franzmann 2008; 
Franzmann 2012; Franzmann 2014; Franzmann 2015; Oevermann and Franzmann 2006). An 
extensive monograph including essential results of this research is underway (Franzmann 
2016) and this article is also a product of that research. I am pleased to see that there are many 
more who have conducted or are on the way to conducting such research, as we can only 
master its complex challenges collaboratively. 
Shortcomings of the New Wave of Research on "Non religion" and "Secularity" 
The new wave of research on "non-religion", "secularity", and the like, however, has some 
distinctive shortcomings, if you regard the whole research process from a broader perspective. 
For this reason, this article will offer some suggestions for readjusting research strategies. For 
this purpose, I will later introduce "atheism" and "religious indifference" in a specific way as 
an important conceptual pairing in the sociology of religion. 
The new research boom is comprised of different strands. I will focus on two of them. A first 
strand consists of traditional survey and indicator research with numbers about secularization 
processes and religious transformations. This well-established practice dates back to the days 
of Max Weber, although it has evolved enormously. Since the criticism of the secularization 
thesis was totalized in the 1990s, a remarkable upswing has been noticeable with lots of 
interesting counterevidence for the rivaling approaches of "religious economies" and 
"religious individualization" as well as additional evidence for secularization theory. 
Colleagues like Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Steve Bruce, David Voas, Detlef Pollack, 
Gert Pickel and many others have contributed to its boom. This line of research, however, 
hardly tackles the above-mentioned research desideratum, namely the "puzzle" of secularity 
that Max Weber, Peter L. Berger and others have noted. It instead uses a rather abstract notion 
of secularization, which limits itself to a formal and a solely negative definition of 
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secularization à la Bruce Wilson, in which secularization is deemed to be a "process whereby 
religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance" (Wilson 1966: 14). 
A second strand of research finally brings Colin Campbell's idea of a "sociology of irreligion" 
to life. It is comprised of insightful statistical studies, which seek for example to elucidate the 
composition and characteristics of the "nones" (religiously unaffiliated) — a term that 
functions as a residual category in survey research. There are also many case studies that 
explore the field more openly. Unfortunately, this whole strand has largely lost touch with the 
secularization thesis and theory. There is thus a great danger at the moment that it will end as 
self-referential niche-research, which does not realize its great potential for understanding 
characteristics of modernity and current religious transformations in general. So what I am 
suggesting is a "sociology of irreligion" that explores the features and different variants of 
secularity as an important, strategic part of secularization theory and research. 
The first, more traditional strand of research urgently needs such a sibling, for its typically 
formal and negative notion of secularization falls below the intellectual level of the classical 
secularization theory established by Max Weber. In recent decades, his theory has often been 
shortened, not to say castrated, to a theory of "functional differentiation". However, it is not a 
coincidence, in fact a clear sign of its deficient abstractness, that this differentiation approach 
has been used as a core theory by proponents and opponents of secularization theory alike. Of 
course, Max Weber's secularization theory undoubtedly remained rudimentary. However, 
Weber clearly moved in the direction of a material, positive notion of secularization. For him, 
secularization was a process of "disenchantment", "rationalization", and "intellectualization". 
This implies that there is something that becomes disenchanted, rationalized, intellectualized: 
culture-building worldviews and interpretations of human life practice that have to be studied 
in detail in order to understand just what "secularization" factually means. Thus, Weber's 
approach did not limit itself to a subtraction perspective (losing religion) and to only a formal 
notion of secular contents of belief (which is of course easier to operationalize within survey 
research, but deficient as a matter of fact). Weber was interested in the concreteness of the 
transformation processes, the dialectics of decay and emergence as a whole. His approach has 
inspired a strand of research which followed the specific history of religious ideas and their 
line of transformation towards secular successors (the secularization of history, progress, 
time, sin, death and so on), of religious institutions towards secular ones. However, this 
research never reached the biographical level of individual belief and life-conduct on a 
systematic scale. It is high time to address this as the "puzzle" of individual secularity has 
already remained underresearched for a long time. 
"Atheism" and "Religious Indifference" as Structure-analytical, Dialectical Concepts 
Before specifying a strategic program for future research, I will turn towards the notions of 
"atheism" and "religious indifference". They are only two of a series of expressions, which are 
used in the new wave of research, such as "secularity", "secularism", "secularization", "non-
religion", "irreligion", "unbelief", "unaffiliated", "nones", "agnosticism", and others. We have 
good reasons, however, to give particular attention and importance to them for analytical 
purposes. This applies in particular to the perspective of secularization research. 
Scholars of religious studies are aware that the original word meaning of "atheism" goes back 
to the Greek word "atheos", which simply means "without god" or "godless". However, in 
everyday language it denotes more frequently an openly rejectionist attitude to the belief in 
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(a) god, ultimately an anti-theistic, if not in general an anti-religious stance. This applies 
again in the case of today's "new atheism", which continues with the older tradition of religion 
criticism. Reasons for this linguistic practice are historical. Many cases, for which the term 
was used in the last 250 years, also in fact had an anti-religious tendency and the meaning of 
words is of course shaped by its concrete usage in common practice. 
Even so, it is an important principle in the social sciences to keep the literal meaning of words 
in view in order to be as explicit as possible. Oftentimes it seems reasonable to depart from 
the everyday usage of an expression and to use it more consistently in its literal meaning. This 
seems to be the case with the words "belief" and "unbelief". Most people automatically think 
of religious beliefs, when they hear the word "belief". However, secular people also conduct 
their lives according to "beliefs", if you focus on the literal meaning of the expression. To use 
the word "belief" in a way that includes secular worldviews carries great potential for the 
social sciences to correct false assumptions about secular people. That is for instance the view 
that secular worldviews are principally based on supreme knowledge and not on belief or the 
opposite view that as "unbelief" they lack all the positive aspects of "believing" like hope, life 
optimism, confidence in the future, a sense of purpose, motivation, a feeling of security and 
so on. 
In the case of "atheism", however, I am advocating a scholarly usage, which gives priority to 
the colloquial and not the literal meaning. Why? Because in this particular case, the literal 
meaning is hidden from recipients who do not have a knowledge of Greek, Latin or 
etymology. Another reason is that we urgently need an appropriate name for the many cases 
that not only conduct their life without a belief in (a) god, but also have a clear tendency 
towards hostility to religion, a tendency for a forced rejection of it that is embraced as a 
means of stabilizing their identity. The advantages of this conceptual strategy should become 
clearer in the course of this article. 
The notion "religious indifference" allows different interpretations too. For example, you can 
think of an attitude to religion that is characterized by a narrow-minded disinterest and 
illiterate ignorance. In this case, the relation to religion is generally indifferent. Some scholars 
define the notion more specifically. They speak of religious indifference if people do not take 
a decision about believing or not believing in religious contents, i.e. if people leave the 
question open as to whether religious statements are true for them or not (see e.g. Gartner, 
Pollack, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2003). Note, however, that this does not necessarily exclude an 
interest in religious questions. 
I propose to use the notion in an even more specific way, which is closely related to the 
notion "atheism" as explained above. Whereas an atheist's identity is negatively bound to 
religion, a religiously indifferent person conducts life in a secular manner without any 
immanent impulse to justify itself in contrast to religion. Religious contents have simply 
stopped being meaningful for this person's life-conduct. Neither do they function as belief that 
guides life-conduct, nor do they serve negatively as a counterpart that helps stabilize a 
precarious self-identity by means of demarcation. To say that religious contents have, in this 
case, stopped being meaningful in life-conduct implies that this does not necessarily hold for 
other aspects. Indeed, "religious indifference" is here strictly limited to the practical role of 
religious contents in personal life-conduct. This implies that such an individual can 
nevertheless be interested in studying religion. He or she can cooperate intensively with 
religious believers and religious organizations, appreciate their contributions to society, and 
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acknowledge their historical achievements. For an individual to be deemed "religiously 
indifferent", it suffices that in his or her personal identity and life-conduct religious contents 
have ceased to be meaningful in a positive or negative manner, because they have been 
replaced in a sustainable way by secular contents. In contrast to, a classical "atheist" 
emphasizes, if not to say exaggerates, negative aspects of religions and of their history, by, for 
example, unilaterally denouncing historical crimes by religious institutions. 
Such a use of the notion of "religious indifference" does not imply "indecision" with regard to 
religious questions, as in the definition of Christel Gärtner, Detlef Pollack and Monika 
Wohlrab-Sahr (Gartner, Pollack, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2003). On the contrary, the decision to 
accede to secular contents of belief inevitably implies decisions "against" believing in god and 
other religious matters. It implies decisions "against" different secular contents of belief as 
well. Such factual decisions "against" religious interpretations of life, however, do not 
automatically imply a negative bond to religion. These decisions are in many cases "pro" 
secular in the first place and "contra" religion only by implication. Only where pro secular 
decisions are made openly against religion can we talk about an atheistic identity which is 
negatively bound to religion. Such an atheist stabilizes itself by means of forced negation of 
religion comparable with an adolescent, who facilitates his pulling away from its parents by 
means of excessive criticism. In contrast to that, for a religiously indifferent individual 
religion has ceased to be an object of personal preoccupation, because such an individual has 
already pulled away from religion successfully. It has grown out of it, so to speak, and 
become established with its secular life-conduct, which legitimates itself only by its own 
belief contents. There is no need any more for additional stabilization by means of negation. 
That is why it can be more balanced in its judgment about religion compared with a classical 
atheist, who struggles to move away from religion. Such "religious indifference" represents an 
advanced form of secularization that prospers at a later stage of secularization history. 
Some sociologists of religion see in the history of secularization a movement from anti-
religious atheism towards a-religious indifference. Members of the clergy also recognized 
such a trend, such as the Vatican's "Pontifical Council for Culture" at its plenary assembly 
from March 11-13, 2004 on the theme of "Where is Your God? Responding to the Challenge 
of Unbelief and Religious Indifference Today".1 Together with Ulrich Oevermann, I applied a 
similar perspective at a conference in 2003 (Oevermann and Franzmann 2006). However, it 
has been discussed in particular in Britain. For example, Colin Campbell had already written 
in 1971, that  
there has been considerable discussion of the tendency for the a-religious 
response to have gradually supplanted the anti-religious response as the 
primary form of irreligion in British society. The first half of the nineteenth 
century had been marked by virulent anti-religious campaigns, but by mid-
Victorian times these had died down and instead of attacking religion 'many 
people were simply uninterested in religion or else regarded it as a curious 
historical phenomenon destined like others to pass away'. 
CAMPBELL 1971: 25, see also BAGG and VOAS 2010; BRUCE 2002: 41-43 
 
1 Concluding document of this assembly at www.vatican.va. 
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However, although some scholars recognize the factual importance of the conceptual pair of 
"atheism" and "religious indifference", and although some use these or similar notions to 
point to an historical trend within the dynamics of secularization, there has been no consistent 
attempt so far to explicate them theoretically. Their usage remains descriptive, sometimes 
theoretically inconsistent or is aimed at classifying phenomena. However, describing things 
or classifying them is not the same as analyzing them. A descriptive or classificatory usage of 
these notions without a theoretical framework is of course legitimate. However, I argue we 
should use them in the first place for things that are more important: for analytical-theoretical 
purposes. They have great potential as a conceptual pair, which denotes two different 
structural types within a continuum of secularization. Classical "atheism" falls into the earlier 
stage of (manifest) secularization at the individual level. "Religious indifference" is a product 
of advanced secularization. Of course, the transitions are fluid. Because both notions receive 
their shape through a dynamic framework, we can also call them dialectic notions. 
''Atheism" is marked by its proximity to religion. This has two important implications. First, 
its manifestations paradoxically resemble in many aspects the religious culture that his 
proponents criticize. For this reason, some scholars tend to speak of "secular religion". 
Atheistic groups frequently build their secular lives by analogy with a former religion to cope 
with the task of filling the gap the abandoned religion has left. For these reasons, many 
atheistic manifestations take the form of a cobbled together surrogate religion. People from 
traditional religious communities frequently misinterpret this artificiality and lack of 
originality as proof that religions are indispensable. However, this is only the result of the 
low, rudimentary development of individual secularization, which at this early stage can 
hardly do without some borrowing from the abandoned religion. That is changing 
fundamentally in the course of advancing secularization. The second important implication of 
the proximity of atheism to religion is that it generates a sharp tension for its proponents, 
because they tend to pull away from religion, but have not yet succeeded in doing so. In this 
respect, they are comparable with adolescents, who are prepared to mentally leave their 
parents and are striving for a stable identity as autonomous adults. But by definition, they 
have not completed this process. They are in a precarious situation where for structural 
reasons it is tempting for them on an unconscious level to facilitate the process of pulling 
away by means of forced opposition and criticism. A similar thing happens with atheism, 
which belongs, metaphorically speaking, to the "adolescence" of secularization. 
It is worth noting, however, that in this early phase of individual secularization a forced 
negation and criticism of religion is not really necessary. Adolescents too do not in any case 
rebel against their parents. There is an interesting example of an early stage of individual 
secularization without forced negation of religion which is offered by Max Weber. In his 
often cited letter to Ferdinand Tönnies (dated 19.2.1909, the letter is published in the "Max 
Weber Gesamtausgabe" 11/6, pp. 63-66, and in Vahland 2001: 47 f.), in which he described 
himself as "religiously unmusical", Weber made clear that the religious content of belief in 
general has lost its "believability" for him. In this regard, the decline of the religiously 
founded German Empire in the early twentieth century, the transition to democracy with its 
secular principle of legitimating state authority (i.e. the sovereignty of the people) was an 
important trigger. 
His rudimentary secularity, however, was not a satisfying solution for him either. It came to 
resemble a vacuum rather than a robust fundament. It was against this background that Weber 
described himself as "religiously unmusical", as if his a-religiosity was the result of personal 
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shortcomings. He made it unequivocally clear, however, that for his personal life he refused 
the religious content of belief through his own free will. His unsatisfying, rudimentary 
secularity, which nevertheless was a point of no return for him, also allowed him to see his 
position as a loss of the former religious culture. In this context, he came to the peculiar 
formula of being "religiously unmusical". Being authentic in this situation of a secular 
vacuum was his top priority.2 That is why he rejected all forms of inauthentic retro-religiosity 
as well as atheistic surrogate religions, which criticized religions in a one-sided, inauthentic 
way and at the same time imitated them instead of conducting the secular life consistently 
according to its own standards. Weber was not yet in the position of "religious indifference". 
He was not an "atheist" either, one who facilitates his pulling away from religion by the 
(unconscious) trick of a forced and therein also in some aspects inauthentic negation of 
religion. Certainly, people such as Weber were historical exceptions who possessed an 
unusually radical focus on authenticity as a consequence of a scientific or artistic search for 
experience and truth. For this reason, the conceptual pairing of "atheism" and "religious 
indifference" is appropriate as a means of characterizing the normal flow of individual 
secularization.3 
I agree with Steve Bruce's "imagination" that religious indifference represents the "endpoint" 
of individual secularization (Bruce 2002: 42), although only in a quite distinct sense: There is 
no other category that replaces "religious indifference" at a later time. This certainly does not 
mean, however, that the process of secularization will come to an end. When the process of 
pulling away from religion is complete and the individual has reached the state of a self-
sustainable secularized life-conduct, the process of disenchantment, rationalization, and 
intellectualization can still continue and affect further aspects and details of human life. Then, 
the transformation continues within the general category of "religious indifference". If you 
regard secularization as a material and not just a formal transformation of cultural worldviews 
like Weber, then this process never reaches a definitive endpoint and you have to concede that 
there are processes of disenchantment, rationalization, and intellectualization within the 
sphere of secularity as well.4 For example, one rather obvious motive behind the pronounced 
criticism levelled against the secularization thesis in the last two decades was to overcome the 
questionable secularism of the 1960s and 1970s, which has also shaped the social sciences. 
The secularist attitude of this time with its proximity to Marxist ideas frequently served as a 
surrogate religion. It still had a collectivist character like religions being criticized. This often 
led to intolerance and arrogance toward religious believers, who were lumped together as 
being "backward" without closer attention to individuals. The secularist proponents in the 
social sciences often replaced religion with social scientific theories, thereby blurring the line 
between theory and practice and turning science into a quasi-religious and at the same time a 
technocratic undertaking that should lead the people and their practice to emancipation. The 
disenchantment of this secularism was in fact a further secularization step. You can even track 
 
2 However, it is true that he tended sometimes to drift towards a stylized pose of soberness and realism. 
3 The term "authentic" does not necessarily imply value-judgments. In this article it does definitely not. The experienced analyst 
of cases knows that "inauthenticity" can also be analytically identified as a quality within the whole set of available semiotic 
expressions of a case. You do not need to apply standards that are coming from outside to speak of authenticity. As an analyst, 
you only reconstruct a case by its own standards that he or she can also miss of course. 
4 Just the same, you have to consider that there are transformations of religions, which follow the direction of disenchantment, 
rationalization, and intellectualization, although manifest secular contents of belief are not involved. Such transformations appear 
as an approximation to secularization. For this reason, I have never understood why Peter L. Berger and others put forward 
examples of religious vitality like the boom in Protestant sects in Latin America, Africa and Asia to disprove the secularization 
thesis (typically without any closer examination), as these examples seem to fit very well with Weber's classical secularization 
approach. 
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the motive of overcoming the secularist attitude of the 1960s and 1970s in Rodney Stark's 
criticism. In 1999, for instance, he wrote the following footnote: 
Then in 1968, in contrast to all of this intellectual pussy-footing, Peter 
Berger (1968: 3) told the New York Times that the by 'the 21st century, 
religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled 
together to resist a worldwide secular culture.' [...] I quote his statements 
during the 1960s only because they so fully express the mood of the times, a 
mood that I shared. 
STARK 1999: 251 
A problem with Stark's criticism is that he assimilates all proponents of the secularization 
thesis to the secularist attitude of the 1960s and 1970s. He even attributed Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim with the words "that religion is false and harmful" (Stark and Finke 2000: 
28), which is grossly untrue. Furthermore, it is almost inconceivable that Max Weber, the 
author of classic secularization theory, would have made such an incautious prediction as that 
of Berger. 
A Strategic Focus for Future Secularization Research 
In this final section, I wish to specify a strategic focus for future secularization research in the 
light of what I have said above. I have argued that more scholars should engage 
systematically in empirically reconstructing secularized forms of individual belief and life-
conduct, because most of the long-lasting controversies about secularization concern the 
individual level that has remained an underresearched "puzzle". The new wave of research 
already contributes to closing this research gap. However, to gain strategic importance for 
key debates about modernity, secularization and religious transformation, it has to be more 
ambitious in theoretical terms. It has to integrate secularization theory systematically in its 
research efforts. In this section, I will advocate also that in doing so scholars should pay 
particular attention to advanced forms of secularized belief and life-conduct, i.e. 
manifestations of religious indifference. The simplest reason for this is that these 
manifestations are newer phenomena, whereas atheism has a long history. This is reflected in 
social scientific research. We know much more about atheism in fact, whereas the majority of 
scholars have not even learned to distinguish clearly between atheism and religious 
indifference. There is a second and more important reason: the special significance of 
advanced forms for understanding development processes. As our language already suggests, 
a later stage of "development" reveals more openly through its differentiation the inbound 
tendency, the nature of its driving logic. For this reason, it is much easier to understand the 
dynamical logic of individual secularization by means of analyzing advanced manifestations. 
I think Durkheim was wrong when he assumed in his "Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life" that it is easier to reconstruct universal aspects of the religious life by means of 
analyzing its most "primitive" forms. The opposite in fact seems to be true. The lack of 
phenomenological complexity of early human societies implies that many aspects build a 
complex fusion, where it is very difficult to identify single aspects, because they are 
amalgamated with others. On the other hand, very complex societies with a great degree of 
differentiation have a confusing phenomenological complexity at first sight. It is easier, 
however, to identify different aspects because they are already differentiated in reality. Such a 
society is much more "developed". In order to understand the nature of individual 
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secularization, we should therefore engage in particular in empirically reconstructing its most 
advanced, "developed" forms, i.e. secularized religious indifference. 
From this perspective, the methodological premise of Charles Taylor's monumental study of 
''A Secular Age" (Taylor 2007) seems questionable. Taylor justified his impressive and in 
many aspects very interesting walks through the history of ideas, which led to the "secular 
age" of our time, with the sentence: "I have told a long story, because I believe that one can 
only get a handle on this [the secular age] if one comes at it historically." (Taylor 2007: 768 
[emphasis added]) But how can you track the history of something, the 
"Entstehungsgeschichte" (Taylor 2007: 26), appropriately without clarifying the object of 
investigation first? I learned that an appropriate reconstruction of the historical formation of 
"something" depends on a clear notion and systematic understanding of the object, whose 
formation process should be investigated. In a way, the latter leads the former. For this 
reason, a deficient concept of secularity automatically limits a historical investigation of its 
formation right from the start. I feel that this applies to Taylor's book. For many years, I 
analyzed advanced forms of a secularized "religious indifference" and what I have learned 
from this does not match with Taylor's notion of secularity and secularization. Taylor seems 
to derive his notion (as well as his central metaphor of a "buffered self") from 18th century 
enlightenment philosophy, as if there was no major progress in the centuries afterwards. He 
does not analyze current manifestations, nor does he look at the secular life-conduct of living 
people instead of abstract philosophical discourses. For these reasons, I think he misses 
important aspects of individual secularization. To give but two examples. 1.) I learned from 
my analyzes that "authenticity" gains particular significance in these advanced forms of 
individual secularization. Unfortunately, I cannot enter this topic here in any depth. However, 
Taylor seems to see no connection. There is a related problem with Taylor's interpretation of 
19th century romanticism, where "authenticity" originated as an important value. Taylor puts 
this romantic turn only in opposition to the secular ideas of the enlightenment philosophers. 
For sure, this turn presents itself as a criticism of enlightenment philosophy. However, I think 
that this criticism has to be understood as a criticism of the abstractness of this philosophy, as 
a move towards realizing its enlightenment program, as a move towards becoming concrete 
by actually searching for experience. That is why proponents of romanticism discovered all 
sorts of the Foreign (faraway countries and cultures, craziness, the unconscious, nature, the 
individual, etc.). Against this background, authenticity became important as a central category 
of concrete, i.e. aesthetic, experience. From this perspective, the romantic turn appears above 
all as a remarkable secularization step and not as a countermovement to secularization as 
Taylor suggests. It is no coincidence that it followed the French Revolution of 1789, when the 
secularization process entered its manifest phase on the most general level of political 
constitution. 2.) I also learned from my analyzes to take a fact more seriously, which shows in 
this historical revolution. There the secularization process materialized in the transition from 
the "divine right of kings" to the "sovereignty of the people" as a political legitimation 
principle. This implies that the secularization process materialized among other things in the 
"realization" of autonomy as a secular, "earthly" structure potential of human practice. Here 
the expression "realization" has a twofold meaning. This potential has been recognized and 
articulated in the societal discourse. Simultaneously, it has been realized practically. Both 
aspects are mutually reinforcing and drive a dialectical transformation. The process entered its 
manifest phase on the most general level of political constitution which the French 
Revolution has become a symbol of. However, the process later continued to penetrate the 
interior of society, where it first transformed societal institutions that also became 
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autonomous step by step. It was a long road until this process finally reached down to the 
individual level on a mass scale in the course of the 20th century. On this Level, 
secularization materializes as autonomization too. Now, if secularization materializes as a 
realization of earthly autonomy from the political level over the societal sphere down to the 
individual level, then Charles Taylor's story of the emergence of "a secular option" seems 
incomplete. It does not include the fact that the "secular option" for the individual is itself a 
consequence of the political and societal secularization. The same holds true for the 
pluralization of worldviews. If autonomy has become a fundamental value in society, then 
individual beliefs have to be respected as long as they respect the autonomy of others as well, 
regardless of whether they are comprised of religious or secular contents. By the way, the idea 
of telling the story of the occurrence of a "secular option" is not new. It has been implemented 
very explicitly by the prominent American historian James Turner in his book Without God, 
without creed. The origins of unbelief in America (Turner 1985). I do not know why Taylor 
does not mention this book once in the 870 pages of his own monograph. 
I am suggesting engaging in empirically reconstructing advanced forms of individual 
secularization ("religious indifference") on a broad scale, after years of exploring this research 
focus.5 This implies that I have already tested its fruitfulness extensively with lots of 
interesting insights and clarifications (see the previously mentioned publications), at least 
from my point of view. However, there is so much work that still has to be done. For this 
reason, my work is at best a small contribution. 
There is a last point that seems essential to a successful outcome: the use of research methods. 
These should be able to reconstruct the structure of a case. When I say structure, I think of a 
different notion than the standard definition, where it simply denotes the particular 
relationship of elements. This is far too abstract for the purposes of sociology. Here we 
should think of the particular decision pattern, which an actor (or an acting collectivity) 
exposes in practice. We should also think of the worldview, habitus and other subjective 
dispositions that stand behind this particular selectivity in practice. Without analyzing the 
actual structure of life-conduct and of its guiding belief, we cannot cope with the challenges 
of the outlined research. We do not know much about a case if we only identify isolated 
contents of belief as in classical content analysis. Their architecture is crucial as well as the 
practical decision pattern as a whole. There is one social scientific methodology that I know 
which is well adjusted to this difficult challenge. It is called "objective hermeneutics" 
("Objektive Hermeneutik"), because it focuses on the meaning of utterances6 (or actions and 
artifacts) first, before it speculates about speaker's (or actor's and producer's) intentions.7 The 
German sociologist Ulrich Oevermann initiated it in the 1970s and the core instrument of this 
methodology is "sequential analysis", which systematically follows the factual sequence of 
acts (oftentimes speech acts) in order to reconstruct the factual decision patterns and 
underlying subjective dispositions. There is no other methodology that I know which does 
that. Unfortunately, this methodology is still largely unknown to the English-speaking world, 
although it has been well established in German speaking countries for nearly forty years. 
This is a very strange case of a failed scientific exchange of ideas. However, without such a 
 
5 As I mentioned above, a extensive monography with essential results of this work will be published in the near future (although 
as a German monograph). 
6 Which is among other things a function of the tacit knowledge of intersubjective linguistic rules. 
7 See www.objective-hermeneutics.com. 
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methodology it will be extremely difficult to cope with the challenges of the research outlined 
above. 
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